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COMMENTS
DISCOVERY OF NON-PARTIES' MEDICAL RECORDS IN THE
FACE OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
INTRODUCTION

How would you feel if your confidential medical records were open to
inspection by persons other than yourself, your physician, and those whose
knowledge is necessary for your medical treatment or diagnosis? Would it
make a difference if the information were redacted, such that your name and
address had been removed? How much do your privacy rights in your
medical records mean to you?
If you knew there was a chance that others might gain access to your
medical records, would you still freely disclose embarrassing personal
information about yourself to your physician in order to get the best
treatment or most accurate diagnosis possible? Or would you disclose only
that information you would not feel as violated about, if others got a hold of
your records?
What if you were a party to a lawsuit and non-party medical records
could possibly help you prosecute or defend your position; if the non-party
medical records could help you mitigate damages or dispute causation, then
in fairness should you not be allowed access to this information?
Although our legislature, and in some instances the judiciary, have
constructed privileges to protect our privacy interests, there are times when
our privacy interests may have to yield to truth and justice. This article will
balance the litigant's right to the ascertainment of truth in legal proceedings
against the non-party's right to privacy in their medical records. Part I of
this article discusses the rationale for the physician-patient privilege, the
scope of its coverage, and how it may be waived. Part II reviews the
discovery process, the scope of discovery, and the trial court's power to
restrict or compel discovery. Part HI examines the current state of the law
in dealing with situations where non-party medical records are requested
during discovery. Part IV will weigh the privacy interests of nonparties
against the right to know on behalf of the litigants. Part V offers a solution
on how discovery of non-party medical records should be handled in the
future. Part VI concludes that privacy interests of non-parties outweigh any
compelling need for discovery.
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I. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

A privilege is a peculiar right or a benefit enjoyed by either an
individual or a class of persons.' The physician-patient privilege provides
individuals with the right to keep private medical information
communicated with their physicians!
Although not recognized at common law, the physician-patient
privilege has been enacted by statute in most states.3 There are two main
policy reasons behind the physician-patient privilege. The first reason is to
prevent patient humiliation, hurt feelings, and a tarnished reputation that
may result from the disclosure of sensitive patient information.' The second
reason is to encourage the patient to make a full disclosure of all
information necessary for effective treatment by the physician.'
In California, the physician-patient privilege is held by the patient6 and
covers "confidential communications" made between a patient and
physician.7 A "confidential communication" between patient and physician
includes information obtained by an examination of the patient and
information transmitted between the patient and the physician.8 All
information obtained during the examination of the patient is a "confidential
communication," even if it was not verbally communicated to the
physician.9 The physician-patient privilege, therefore, naturally applies to
hospital and medical records that contain sensitive patient information."0
The physician-patient privilege gives the patient the right to prevent the
disclosure of "confidential communications" and medical records." In
addition to the patient, the privilege may be asserted on behalf of the patient
by a guardian or conservator, by a personal representative of the patient, 2 by
the hospital or by the patient's physician. 3
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197

(6 h

ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK'S].

2. See id. at 1126.
3. See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 436 (1992).

4. See Board of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (plaintiff not entitled to non-party medical records because it infringed on nonparty's privacy rights).
5. See id.
6. See CAL. EviD.

CODE §

993 (Deering, LEXIS through 1999 session).

7. See id. § 992.
8. See id. The statute makes it clear that information including diagnoses and advice
given by the physician is also protected by the privilege. See id.
9. See Hale v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)

(examination of a paralyzed patient was a "confidential communication" even though the
patient was unable to verbally communicate).

10. See Wanda E. Wakefield, Physician-PatientPrivilege as Extending to Patient's
Medical or Hospital Records, 10 A.L.R. 4 552 § la (WESTLAW through Sept. 1999
Supp.).
11. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (Deering, LEXIS through 1999 session).

12. See id.
13. See Wakefield, supra note 10, §§ 3-6.
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The physician-patient privilege may also be waived. A waiver of the
privilege may be express or implied.'4 An implied waiver occurs when a
plaintiff brings a lawsuit and places their medical condition at issue. 5 The
plaintiff will be deemed to have waived their privilege only to information
that is both directly relevant to the issues raised by the litigation and
essential to a fair resolution of the claim.'6 Further, the scope of the waiver
must be narrowly construed in order to prevent plaintiffs being deterred
from bringing legitimate lawsuits because they fear exposure of private
matters. 7 Even where privileged matters are directly relevant to the issues
being litigated, discovery must proceed in the least intrusive manner
possible.
I. THE DISCOVERY PROCESS

Discovery is a pre-trial device used to gather information necessary to
prepare for trial. 9 Pertinent information may be acquired through the use of
interrogatories, requests for documents, and depositions."
Generally, a party may obtain discovery to any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to a claim or defense of any party to the lawsuit.2 "The
information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."'22 This does not mean that overbroad discovery requests will be
tolerated.23 The trial court may impose sanctions upon a party who persists
in obtaining information "outside the scope of permissible discovery,' 24 or
who conducts discovery in a manner "that causes unwarranted annoyance,
embarrassment, or oppression."
Privileged information is not only protected from admission at trial, but
is also protected from discovery.26 A party must expressly give the other
side notice that the information sought is protected.27 If necessary, the party
14. See

WILLIAM

H.

RECORDS AND THE LAW

ROACH

& ASPEN HEALTH

LAW AND COMPLIANCE CENTER, MEDICAL

245 (3 ed. 1998).

15. See id.
16. See Davis v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(defendant not entitled to plaintiff's mental health records when treatment was not related to
injuries suffered in the accident).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 466.
20. See id.

21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
22. Id.
23. See 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery and Depositions § 21 (1987 & Supp. 1999).
24. Id. § 301.
25. Id. § 303.
26. See 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositionsand Discovery § 29 (1999).
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
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claiming the privilege may move the court for a protective order.28
The trial court has the power to limit the scope of discovery if it finds
the attempted discovery to be overly intrusive.29 In cases where sensitive
information is sought the court must weigh the individual's right to privacy
against the litigant's need for the discovery? Even if the individual's right
to privacy is outweighed by the litigant's need for the disputed information,
the court may limit the scope of the discovery "to the extent necessary for a
fair resolution of the lawsuit."'" The trial court's grant of a protective order
may only be reversed for an abuse of discretion.32
In assessing whether a valid claim of privilege has been asserted the
court may engage in an in camera inspection.33 An in camera inspection
allows the judge to privately view documents before ruling on their
admissibility. Where a plaintiff's own medical condition is at issue and
they seek to limit the defendant's discovery only to relevant medical records
bearing on the particular medical conditions at issue, an in camera review
might be a valid undertaking. An in camera inspection, however, would be
of little value when non-party medical records are being sought because
everything contained in the non-party medical records is protected by the
physician-patient privilege.35
If a party fails to comply with a discovery request, the opposing party
may move the court to compel discovery.36 Before compelling discovery, the
trial court must decide whether or not the initial discovery request was
appropriate.37 Upon a finding that the discovery request was justified, the
trial court may compel the discovery and possibly impose sanctions.33
The sanctions are not designed to be punitive; instead their goal is "to
protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery."39 The trial
court, in its discretion, may prohibit the disobedient party from supporting
or opposing certain claims or defenses,' or may prohibit the introduction of
certain evidence at trial.4 If a party fails
to comply with a court order, the
court may hold that party in contempt ' 2 and either stay the action until the

28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c).
29. See supra note 23, § 47.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. § 48.
Id.
See id. § 52.
See supra note 26, § 29.
See BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 760.
See supra note 26, § 262.
See supra note 23, § 296.
See id. § 299.
See id.
Id.
See id. § 308.
See id. § 309.
See id. § 310.
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court order is obeyed,43 or dismiss the action altogether." A dismissal for
willful failure to obey a court order is a judgment on the merits resulting in
claim preclusion. ' If a nonparty fails to comply with a discovery order, then
their only relief is to appeal to a higher court. '
Im. WHEN NON-PARTY MEDICAL RECORDS ARE REQUESTED IN DISCOVERY

Litigants often attempt to discover the medical records of non-parties.'
There are two major situations where access to non-party medical records is
frequently attempted; The first situation involves a child who has suffered
some type of cognitive, behavioral, or developmental injury as the result of
the defendant's negligence.48 In these cases, the defendant will attempt to
discover medical records of the plaintiff's family members in order to
dispute causation by alleging that the plaintiff had a genetic or familial
propensity for the claimed injuries.' This type of discovery can be found in
lead poisoning cases and injury at birth cases. Attempted discovery of nonparty medical records may also occur in other types of cases, where learning
disabilities or cognitive injuries are pursued."
The second situation involves a medical malpractice action where the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant physician has a pattern or history of
negligence or wrongdoing. Here, the plaintiff is the one seeking access to
non-party medical records in order to prove that the physician was
incompetent or regularly breached the necessary standard of care.
The following subsections will take a closer look at the issues
surrounding the discovery of non-party medical records in lead paint cases,
injuries at birth, and medical malpractice and product liability cases.
A. Lead Paint Cases
In lead paint poisoning cases where parents have alleged that their child
suffered injuries from lead exposure including learning disabilities and
decreased cognitive functioning, defendants have sought to discover
medical records not only belonging to the injured child but those of the

43. See id. § 312.
44. See id. § 313.

45. See id. Claim preclusion or res judicata is a doctrine barring a subsequent action
involving the same parties and the same cause of action. See BLACK'S supra note 1, at 1305.
46. See supra note 23, § 310.
47. See generally Harold L. Hirsh, The Great Wall About Non-party Patients' Medical
Records is Crumbling, 31 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 434 (1985).
48. See generally Hope Viner Sambom, Blame It on the Bloodline: Discovery of
Nonparties' Medical and Psychiatric Records is Latest Defense Tactic in Disputing

Causation, ABA J., Sept. 1999, at 28.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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mother and the siblings as well.5
Besides lead poisoning, there are many possible factors that may
contribute to a child having learning disabilities, including genetic causes."2
It is on this crux that many defendants rest their argument. They claim that
in order to fairly assess the issue of causation in a negligence suit, genetic
factors must be ruled out and in order to do so they need to examine the
medical records of the child's mother and the child's siblings.'
Even if defendants were given access to these medical records there is
only a 40-80% chance that genetics may have been a contributing factor to
the child's learning disabilities and cognitive defects.' In light of the fact
that there are many risk factors that may have contributed to the child's
cognitive injuries,55 and the fact that one can only speculate as to whether
genetics had anything to with these injuries,56 the probative value of the
family's medical records would seem almost inconsequential.
It has been noted that allowing discovery of the family's medical
records would raise more questions than it would answer.' For instance, if a
sibling was shown to also suffer from a learning disability, then a
determination must be made as to whether the sibling was also exposed to
lead. If lead exposure could be ruled out, then a further determination must
be made as to whether the sibling's injury was caused by factors totally
independent of the plaintiff's injuries." If, for example, the child's mother
was shown to have some type of learning disability, then it must be
determined whether she inherited the disability, whether the disability was
caused by environmental factors, or whether the disability may have been
the result of a prior injury, which could have occurred as far back as when
the mother was in utero.
If these are the questions that must necessarily be answered in order to
find out whether a learning disability is genetic in nature, then it would
seem that the scope of discovery could be broadened indefinitely. 9
Allowing this type of discovery would not only broaden the scope of
litigation beyond recognition, it would disregard our legal system's goal of
quickly and efficiently resolving disputes by wasting considerable time on
purely speculative issues.
51. See id.
52. See Andon v. 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 690 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) (mother of child injured from lead exposure was not required to undergo IQ testing
because such testing is inconclusive and intrusive).
53. See Samborn, supra note 48, at 28.
54. See Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of
Discovery in Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REv. 1025, 1048 (1997).
55. See Andon, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
56. See Monica W. v. Milevoi, 685 N.Y.S.2d 231, 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (siblings
medical information in lead exposure case held too speculative to be useful).
57. SeeAndon, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
58. See Monica W., 685 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
59. See Andon, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
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Will the discovery of non-party medical records be compelled in the
future?' As genetic science continues to find answers to questions we did
not know we had, we can only expect discovery attempts of this kind to
increase."' In the future, these genetic answers will only increase the
relevance of non-party medical records. If courts now are willing to compel
non-parties to submit to IQ testing, where the relevance and probability that
genetics played any role in the child's injuries is speculative at best, one can
only imagine that non-party privacy rights will have to yield to the truthseeking discovery process more in the future. 2
B. Injury at Birth Cases
Many children are born with serious birth defects.63 As a result, parents
will bring lawsuits on behalf of their injured children against the treating
physicians for negligent treatment or diagnoses.'
In bringing a lawsuit on behalf of their children, the representative
parents are not putting their own medical conditions at issue, and therefore
the physician-patient privilege as to their own medical records remains
intact;' however, they are putting their child's medical condition at issue.66
The plaintiff child will be deemed to have waived the physician-patient
privilege to any relevant medical information.67
The defendant physicians, in an effort to dispute causation, will often
make overbroad discovery requests.6 They have sought the medical
histories of both the mother and the father,69 as well as those of other
siblings."° It is their contention that the injuries may be attributed to other
causes, such as environmental or gestational causes, in utero trauma, 1 and
60. I have yet to find a lead paint case where non-party medical records were compelled.
But see Anderson v. Seigel, 680 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (discovery of
academic and work records has been compelled, and IQ testing was required).
61. See Wriggins, supra note 54, at 1088.
62. See id. at 1068.
63. See generally Palay v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839, 840 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (cardiac abnormalities); Rubino v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 481 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (brain damage); Scharlack v. Richmond Mem'l Hosp., 477 N.Y.S.2d
184, 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy); Yetman v. St.
Charles Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (central nervous system
damage).
64. See generally cases cited supra note 63.
65. See 58 N.Y. JUR. 2D Evidence and Witnesres § 886 (1986) (WESTLAW through
April 1999 Annual Cumulative Supp.).
66. See Rubino, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 624.

67. See id.
68. See Palay, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842; Scharlack, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 186; Rubino, 481

N.Y.S.2d at 624.
69. See Rubino, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
70. See Scharlack, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
71. See Palay,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845.
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genetics, as opposed to being the product of their own negligence.'
Although defendant physicians often make overbroad discovery requests,
they have a legitimate interest in preparing their defense.'
The prenatal period is an important time in the development of the
unborn child. In order to determine the cause of the alleged birth defects, it
is crucial that the defendant have access to medical information pertaining
to the prenatal period.74 The only source of this information is the mother's
medical records." The courts, recognizing this limitation, have created what
is known as the "impossibility of severance" theory.
The "impossibility of severance" theory is based on the notion that at
the time the infant is in utero, the infant and the mother's medical histories
are so intertwined that they cannot be separated.' Under this theory, the
courts have held that while the infant is in utero, the mother's prenatal
medical records are necessarily the medical records of the infant, and are
therefore discoverable.78
In California, an appellate court has gone a step further and held that
even if the prenatal medical records were not discoverable under the
"impossibility of severance" theory, public policy demands their
disclosure. 79 It was reasoned that the mother should not be allowed to
frustrate the injured child's legitimate claims for compensation by
withholding vital evidence.' Before allowing the discovery, however, the
trial court was required to conduct an in camera inspection to accommodate
the mothers privacy interests.8"
The scope of the discovery is limited to the prenatal period.' The
mother's medical records outside of that period are off limits. Likewise,
the father's medical records,84 and those of other siblings,' are also outside
the scope of discovery. However, if the mother provides information
concerning prior pregnancies and miscarriages to the injured child's
subsequent treating physician for the purpose of aiding in the infant's

72. See Rubino, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
73. See Palay,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Yetman v. St. Charles Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
77. See supra note 65.
78. See Palay, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840; Scharlack v. Richmond Mem'l Hosp., 477
N.Y.S.2d 184, 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Yetman, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 745.

79. See Palay,'22Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id.
See id. at 848.
See supra note 65.
See Murphy v. LoPresti, 648 N.Y.S.2d 169, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).

84. See Rubino v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 481 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1984).
85. See Scharlack v. Richmond Mem'l Hosp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984).
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medical treatment and diagnosis, then she will be deemed to have waived
her privilege to such information. 6
Some courts have been more liberal in allowing limited discovery into
the medical histories of family membersY Although not compelling the
disclosure of family member's medical records, these courts have attempted
to circumvent the physician-patient privilege by requiring the representative
parent to testify to facts about their family's medical histories-8
New York's highest court compared the physician-patient privilege to
that of the attorney-client privilege, and then concluded that a non-party
witness may not refuse to disclose medical facts simply because they were
communicated within the confines of the physician-patient relationship. 9
The court, however, failed to take into account basic differences in the
privileges. The attorney-client privilege protects communications made
between a client and attorney in furtherance of rendering legal services, but
it does not protect underlying facts.' The physician-patient privilege, on the
other hand, protects sensitive medical facts in order to prevent patient
humiliation and embarrassment.'
The information a patient discloses to their physician is generally more
intimate and private than that which one might tell their attorney. It is in the
patient's best interests to tell their physician all the facts that might be
pertinent to an accurate diagnosis, and allowing discovery of such facts
would leave little for the physician-patient privilege to protect. Fortunately,
not all courts have been willing to make a distinction between testimony and
medical records.'
Instead of denying discovery, the parents may choose to waive the
physician-patient privilege with respect to their own medical records and to
those of their minor children;93 however, they may not waive the privilege
on behalf of children who have already reached the age of majority. ' If the
parents refuse to disclose information pertaining to themselves and their
children, then they will then be precluded from using such information at

86. See Yetman v. St. Charles Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
87. See Williams v. Roosevelt Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1985); Rubino, 481 N.Y.S.2d
at 622.
88. See cases cited supra note 87.
89. See Williams, 488 N.E.2d at 94.
90. See FED. R. EviD. § 501.
91. See Board of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979).
92. Forcing people to testify about facts contained in their medical records is essentially
the same thing as requiring them to hand over their records. See Yetman, 491 N.Y.S.2d at
745. There is no logical reason for making a distinction between medical records and

testimony concerning their content; therefore, both should enjoy the protections of the
physician-patient privilege. See id.

93. See Scharlack v. Richmond Mem'l Hosp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984).
94. See id.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999

9

California Western Law Review, Vol. 36 [1999], No. 2, Art. 12
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

trial." This safeguard was created in order to prevent the plaintiff from
gaining an unfair advantage at trial.96
C. MedicalMalpracticeand ProductsLiability Cases
In medical malpractice and product liability cases plaintiffs have sought
the medical records of non-parties in order to discover relevant information
that may help support their claims.' Generally, courts have refused to allow
discovery of non-party medical records on grounds that the records are
protected by the physician-patient privilege.98 Some have held that non-party
medical records are irrelevant," and that discovery in medical malpractice
actions should be directed toward whether the standard of care was breached
rather than at non-party medical records."°
Other courts have allowed this type of discovery provided there are
adequate safeguards to protect non-party identities."' For example, in
Ziegler v. Superior Court" the plaintiff brought an action against a hospital
for negligent supervision of a physician who unnecessarily had her undergo
a pacemaker implantation.0 3 The plaintiff sought to compel the hospital to
disclose the medical records of other patients who had also undergone the
same surgery unnecessarily."' This information was highly relevant because
actual or constructive notice is a necessary element of a negligent
supervision claim." The court allowed the discovery request on condition
that: (1) no names or identifying information be revealed; (2) after review
by the parties, the court would seal the records; (3) no attempt would be
made to identify or contact any of the patients; and (4) the communication
of this information outside of the parties to the action, except as may occur
at trial, was prohibited.0 6 The Ziegler court reasoned that the limited
intrusion was outweighed by the public policy of ensuring hospitals will
95. See id. at 186; Yetman, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
96. See Scharlack, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
97. See I J.N. DEMEO & JOHN DEMEo, CALIFORNIA DEPIOSION AND DIscoVERY
PRACTICE § 24.12[5] (Matthew Bender & Co. 1999).
98. See generally Audrey W. Collins, Annotation, Discovery in Medical Malpractice
Action, of Names and Medical Records of Other Patients to Whom Defendant has Given
Treatment Similar to thatAllegedly Injuring Plaintiff,66 A.L.R. 5'" 591 (WESTLAW 1999).
99. See Pusateri v. Fernandez, 707 So.2d 892, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (other
patient records are irrelevant to a negligence claim for failure to timely evaluate and treat

complications from surgery).
100. See McCann v. Foisy, 552 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff was

not entitled to non-party medical information because the physician's negligence can be
proved by methods other than invading the privacy of strangers).
101. See generallyCollins, supra note 98.

102. 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 1251.
See id.
See id. at 1255.
See id. at 1254.
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competently monitor their staffs.' °7
Other courts that have allowed discovery have not been quite as
restrictive as the appellate court in Ziegler. In Bennett v. Fieser,03 the
parents of a newborn alleged that the defendant physician was negligent in
handling the birth of their son by abandoning his mother while she was in
labor."l The physician defended his absence on grounds that he had to
attend to an emergency burn patient."' In order to determine whether the
physician's absence was justified, the plaintiffs sought the medical records
of the bum patient to assess the seriousness of the situation."'
The court in Bennett allowed the discovery of the non-party medical
records on two conditions."' First, the patient's name and other identifying
information had to be deleted before releasing the records."3 Second, the
plaintiff's were not to attempt to learn the identity of, or try to contact the
patient."' The court required this second condition because, "providing
medical records with names and identifying information removed could
nonetheless provide vital clues which would assist a party in identifying the
non-party patient.""' 5 The Bennett court reasoned that these conditions
would adequately protect the non-party's privacy interests and would
"preserve the spirit of the physician-patient privilege."' 6
Still other courts have been more reluctant in the handling of non-party
medical records by refusing the disclosure of even redacted versions. In
Binder v. Superior Court, ' a widow brought an action on behalf of her
deceased husband against his physician for failure to diagnose a lesion on
the decedent's leg as a melanoma.' The plaintiff sought discovery of
photographs the defendant previously had taken of other patient's lesions
that had been diagnosed as or suspected to be melanomas." 9
The defendant, a dermatologist, who customarily took pictures of his
patient's skin lesions, refused to release the photographs on grounds that the
pictures were confidential communications taken during a medical
examination for diagnostic purposes, and were protected by the physicianpatient privilege.'20 In response, the plaintiff argued that releasing the
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 1255.
152 F.R.D. 641 (D. Kan. 1994).
See id. at 642.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 643.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
242 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Cal Ct. App. 1987).
See id. at 232. Melanoma is a cancerous growth of the skin. See TABERS
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1186 (17 ed. 1993) [hereinafter TABERS].
119. See Binder,242 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
120. See id.
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pictures of the lesions alone, without any individual identifying information,
would not violate the physician-patient privilege.' In refusing to allow the
discovery, the Binder court held that merely releasing the photographs
would offend patients' sensibilities and would discourage patients from
allowing their ailments to be photographed, which would defeat the policy
of encouraging patients to make a full disclosure of all information
necessary for effective treatment.
Again, in Parkson v. CentralDupage Hospital,"Z' a medical malpractice
and product liability case for injuries allegedly caused by an investigational
new drug, the plaintiffs sought to compel the defendant hospital to release
the medical records of other patients who had also been treated with the
drug."M The hospital claimed the physician-patient privilege on behalf of the
non-party patients and refused to disclose their records in contempt of the
trial court's orders.' " The plaintiffs claimed that the privacy interests of the
non-party patients would be adequately protected if the patients' names
were excluded.' 6 On appeal, the order compelling discovery was reversed so
as to protect non-party expectations of privacy. 7 The Parkson Court
reasoned that even if the names had been excluded there was still a
possibility that the non-party patients' confidentiality would be breached.'
In cases where there is a distinct possibility that identification of the
non-party patients can be made or connected to confidential medical
information, courts have refused to allow discovery. In Big Sun Healthcare
Systems v. Prescott,'29 the parents of a deceased three year old girl brought a
negligence action against the defendant hospital on grounds that their
daughter was improperly triaged, and this failure to provide timely and
necessary emergency care was the proximate cause of her death. '" The
hospital defended on grounds that the delay was caused by patients with
more urgent needs.'' To support their claim, the plaintiffs sought the
emergency room sign in log and the triage records containing names and
medical histories of patients seen on the date of this incident. The hospital
invoked the physician-patient privilege on behalf of the non-party patients
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. at 233.
See id. at 234.
435 N.E.2d 140 (I11.App. Ct. 1982).
See id. at 141.

125. See id.
126. See id. at 143.
127. See id. at 144.
128. See id.; see also Glassman v. St. Joseph Hosp., 631 N.E.2d 1186, 1198 (IlL. App.
Ct, 1994) (plaintiff was unable to procure redacted medical records of non-party patients who
had experienced similar surgical complications at the hands of the defendant physician).
129. 582 So.2d 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).

130. See id. at 757. Triage is a screening process conducted in emergency rooms to
determine which patients should be given priority. See TABERS, supra note 118, at 2033.
131. See Big Sun HealthcareSystems, 582 So.2d at 757.
132. See id.
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and refused to disclose the requested documents."
The appellate court held that the sign in log containing the patients'
names was not privileged and therefore discoverable, because it did not
contain medical information, and because it was left in plain view for
subsequent patients to sign as well."M As for the triage records, which did
contain medical information, the court refused to allow discovery of even a
redacted version because it was possible to match the triage record against
the sign in log and ascertain confidential information about the non-party
patients.'3 5 The Big Sun Court noted, however, that a solution to this
problem could be achieved simply by formulating interrogatories to
ascertain the number of patients with more urgent health needs than the
plaintiffs' child.'36
In Marcus v. SuperiorCourt,'37 the plaintiff brought a negligence action
against the defendant physician to recover damages for injuries caused by
certain angiographic testing.'33 In order to assess whether the physician
properly conveyed the seriousness of this procedure to the plaintiff, as
defendant claimed was his normal practice, the plaintiff sought discovery of
the names of other patients who had undergone the same procedure at the
hands of the defendant.'39 To rebut the defendant's claim of privilege on
behalf of the non-party patients, the plaintiff argued that the discovery of
only the names of other patients and not the medical records themselves
would not violate the physician-patient privilege."w The appellate court
denied the discovery request because releasing the names of patients who
had received the exact same tests would necessarily reveal confidential
medical information.'4'
D. Summary of the CurrentState of the Law
It is evident by reviewing the main cases where discovery of non-party
medical records was attempted that the physician-patient privilege provides
a high degree of protection to non-party privacy interests. Just under the
surface, however, there is a feeling of uncertainty as to what the future
might hold. A minority of courts have already allowed disclosure of nonparty medical records provided there were adequate safeguards to protect

133.
134.
135.
136.

See id.
See id. at 758.
See id.
See id.

137. 95 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
138. See id. at 546. Angiography involves the x-raying of blood vessels after a
radiopaque substance has been injected. See TABERS, supranote 118, at 105.
139. See Marcus, 95 Cal Rptr. at 546.
140. See id. at 547.
141. See id.
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the non-party's identity. 42
Additionally, some courts have compelled the disclosure of academic
and work records, as well as required IQ testing.4 4 These disclosures are not
insignificant intrusions into one's privacy. If these intrusions are allowed
now, then it is foreseeable that in the future, as genetic science becomes
more exact, privacy rights in medical records may have to give way to
discovery.'"
Attempting to circumvent the physician-patient privilege by
distinguishing between testimony and actual medical records is not the
solution. The physician-patient privilege is not analogous to the attorneyclient privilege and any comparison is illogical. Forcing someone to testify
about the factual contents of their doctor visits is essentially the same as
compelling them to disclose their medical records. The physician-patient
privilege was meant to protect the confidentiality of embarrassing medical
facts and not just communications made between the patient and
physician."
IV. NON-PARTY PRIVACY INTERESTS VS. FAIRNESS TO LITIGANT
Both the federal and state governments have created zones of privacy. 47
In California, pursuing and obtaining privacy is an inalienable right
protected by the state constitution.' Even the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that, although implied, the right to privacy is guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. 4
The right to privacy gives individuals the right to be free from
unwarranted and undesirable intrusion into their private lives.5 The right to
privacy, however, is not absolute and may be outweighed by a compelling
opposing interest.' Private entities must have a legitimate or important
reason before intruding into the privacy interests of others.'t The
ascertainment of truth in legal proceedings is a legitimate compelling

142. See Collins, supra note 98.
143. See Anderson v. Seigel, 680 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
144. See Wriggins, supra note 54, at 1068.
145. See Yetman v. St. Charles Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 742,745 (N.Y. App.Div. 1985).
146. See Board of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979).
147. See infra notes 148-49.

148. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1999).
149. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (right to privacy is implied
in the 1", 3t' e,
45,
and 9" Amendments).
150. See 13 CAL. JUR. 3D ConstitutionalLaw § 237 (1989 & Supp. 1999).
151. See Board of Med. QualityAssurance, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
152. See Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (employer has a
legitimate interest in knowing whether employee was disabled by stress but obtaining
detailed psychiatric information went beyond what was necessary to accomplish that goal).
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reason.153
The zone of privacy extends to a patient's medical history.t " When a
litigant seeks non-party medical records, the court must balance the nonparty's privacy interests against the need for discovery. 55 "[T]he court
should consider the nature of the information sought, its inherent
intrusiveness, and any specific harm that disclosure of the information
might cause."''
The information contained in one's medical records is very intimate
and personal. This medical information can be so intimate, in fact, that it is
"often difficult to reveal even to the doctor."'' Given the understandable
reluctance to disclose embarrassing personal information even to a personal
physician-believed to be under an obligation to keep such information
private-imagine the outrage when other persons gain access to this
sensitive data.
The inherent intrusiveness into one's private life that would result from
compelling discovery of nonparty medical records cannot be overstated.
What could be more intrusive? Having others rummage through such
intimate and private information can be nothing but objectionable. Even
absent embarrassing or humiliating information in those medical records, it
would still be a serious intrusion to compel discovery of information
previously known only to the patient but disclosed to the physician for the
sole purpose of obtaining medical care.
The physician-patient privilege was created to prevent the specific harm
that disclosure of private medical information may cause.'
Allowing
others access to one's sensitive medical information would likely result in
humiliation, hurt feelings, embarrassment, or a tarnished reputation.'59
Additionally, allowing discovery would discourage patients from fully
disclosing embarrassing information that may be necessary for effective
treatment and diagnosis."w
Even when there is a legitimate opposing interest; the information
sought must be directly relevant to the claims involved."' The party
attempting the discovery has the burden of proving direct relevance."
"Discovery of constitutionally protected information.., is more narrowly
proscribed than traditional discovery" and fishing expeditions will not be

153.
154.
155.
156.

See Britt v. Superior Ct., 574 P.2d 766, 774 (Cal. 1978).
See Pettus, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 72.
See Tylo v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736 (1997).
Schnabel v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 704,714 (1993).

157. Board of Med. Quality Assurance, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 61.

158. See id.
159. See id.

160. See id.
161. See Tylo, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736.

162. See id.
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allowed.' The party attempting the discovery must make a showing greater
than merely asserting that the information sought may lead to relevant
information.'"
In lead paint type cases, non-party medical records are not directly
relevant to the claims involved. The defendants are merely going on a
fishing expedition for other possible causes of the alleged injury. Discovery
of non-party medical records in these cases should be impermissible. It is
also unnecessary because the plaintiff has the burden of proving causation
by a preponderance of the evidence.
With infant injury at birth claims, the mother's prenatal medical records
are directly relevant. The mother and the unborn child cannot be separated
during the prenatal period; therefore, the mother's medical records are
necessarily those of the infants,'" and are directly relevant per se.
In medical negligence cases the issue of direct relevance is more
difficult. In cases where knowledge or notice is an essential element of a
claim, the medical records of non-parties may very well be directly relevant,
but absent such elements, others' medical records are not directly relevant
and the focus of discovery should instead be directed toward whether the
standard of care was breached rather than on non-party medical records.'"
Aside from being directly relevant, there must also be no other feasible
or effective means of obtaining the information.'6" Alternatives, protective
measures, and safeguards should be taken into account to minimize the
intrusion on privacy.' Discovery, if allowed, should be crafted in such a
way that the parties can fairly resolve their disputes without unnecessarily
infringing on the privacy rights of others.'" The scope of the disclosure
should be limited to what is absolutely necessary to accomplish the
legitimate purpose that has been asserted.'70
When balancing privacy rights against the right to a fair resolution of
the issues presented in the lawsuit, certain discovery devices such as
redaction of identifying information, in camera inspection, giving notice to
the non-parties, and sealing court records after review by the parties should
be taken into account. If using these discovery devices could minimize the
intrusion on privacy while simultaneously permitting a fair resolution of the
lawsuit, it would seem a viable solution. However, even with the use of
discovery devices, privacy is still invaded. Although diminished, the
163. Id.
164. See id. See also Board of Trustees of Leland Standford Junior Univ. v. Superior
Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (intrusion into one's privacy is not
justified simply because it may lead to relevant information).
165. See cases cited supra note 78.
166. See McCann v. Foisy, 552 So.2d 341, 342 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
167. See Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
168. See Rains v. Belshe, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

169. See Schnabel v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 704, 714.
170. See Pettus, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 73.
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intrusion might still be objectionable, especially to a non-party who has no
interest in the lawsuit. In addition to intrusiveness, other factors must be
considered when using discovery devices.
Redacting the medical records by removing any identifying information
is one available discovery device. Redacting the identifying information
would presumably protect the non-party's anonymity and confidentiality. If
the physician were to redact the records, the patient's anonymity would be
preserved. If the physician does not have the time, however, then another
pair of eyes must go through the records.'' Some courts have stated that
even with redaction, no matter how remote, there is still a possibility that
identification can be made.'
Additionally, any dissemination of private
medical information, even if redacted, will breach confidentiality.'
In lead paint type cases, redaction of medical records would not be
helpful because only family member's records are being sought to show a
possible genetic cause for the injury. In these cases, the party seeking
discovery must know which records belong to whom. Even if identification
were unnecessary, it would not be difficult to determine identities by
process of elimination, especially in a small family. Redaction would
likewise serve no purpose in injury at birth cases where only the mother's
prenatal records are at issue.
The only situations in which the redaction of identifying information
might serve a valuable purpose are those in which the litigant attempts to
show knowledge or notice of prior similar incidents in order to prove
negligence. Even in those cases, disclosure of redacted medical records may
be unnecessary. Information needed to fulfill the knowledge or notice
elements could possibly be obtained through other means. For example, the
party seeking discovery could attempt to elicit such information through
interrogatories or deposition questions, instead of invading non-party
medical records. Additionally, production of documents requests could be
drafted to include previous complaints, litigation, or incident records.
These alternative methods would arguably tempt defendants, who are
the only parties with access to such information, to be untruthful or even
171. If others are required to go through the medical records because the physician is
unable, then the patient's private medical information will be exposed to these additional
persons. It could be argued that if the physician's staff were responsible for completing this
task, then the patient's privacy would not be invaded. This argument, however, fails to take
into account the patient's expectations. These expectations are clearly embodied in the

physician-patient privilege statute, which states that the "information obtained by an
examination of the patient" shall be disclosed only to those who "disclosure is reasonably
necessary... [to accomplish] the purpose for which the physician was consulted." CAL.
EVm. CODE § 992 (Deering, LEXIS through 1999 session). So, if the staffs' purpose for
going through non-party medical records is to prepare for litigation, instead of for diagnoses
or treatment purposes, then they are violating the patient's privacy rights.
172. See cases cited supra note 128.
173. Confidentiality is defined as the state of keeping a secret. See BLACK'S, supra note
1, at 298. By disclosing one's private medical information you necessarily break the secret or
breach confidentiality.
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forgetful, but this may be a price that has to be paid in order to protect nonparty privacy rights.
In camera inspection and sealing court records after review by the
parties are other available discovery devices. Both of these discovery tools
have one common flaw; they require others to examine the contents of the
medical records in question. For the non-party, inspection of their medical
records, if only by the judge or the parties to the action, is still offensive.
Disclosure of sensitive medical information to just one person other than the
patient's physician would be sufficient to cause harm.
Although in camera inspection could, in theory, minimize any expected
harm, it has drawbacks. In camera inspection would require valuable
judicial time. Someone would have to label and organize the records for the
judge; and if the volume of material is significant, then the judge may need
the help of others in order to complete the inspection. The help that the
judge may need to complete the in camera inspection might actually expose
the confidential data to a greater number of persons than if the discovery
had been allowed in the first place.
Another possible way to minimize the potential harm that disclosure of
medical records may cause is to notify the non-party of the attempted
discovery.'
The party opposing the discovery would be required to give
notice to the non-party so that they might have an opportunity to object to
the disclosure or to seek a protective order.'75 This would give the non-party
a fair opportunity to protect their privacy interests.
One downside to a notice requirement is that the party seeking
discovery must rely on the honesty and diligence of the opposing party in
contacting the non-parties. This problem might be overcome by having the
judge supervise the process. Judicial supervision, however, would almost
certainly require that the identities of the non-parties be revealed to the
judge. If the judge later decides to admit redacted versions of the records,
then both the non-party's anonymity and confidentiality will have been
breached at least to the judge. As stated above, disclosure of medical
records to even one person other than the patient's physician would not only
be offensive but would be sufficient to cause harm.
V. SOLUTION

Non-party medical records should be strictly off-limits. After reviewing
the cases and evaluating the litigants need for the discovery of non-party
medical records, as well as the potential value and downfalls of the various
174. See Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977, 980 (Cal. 1975)

(litigant not entitled to non-party bank records without first giving non-party an opportunity
to object); see also Olympic Club v. Superior Court, 282 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(golf club required to notify non-parties of city's attempted discovery of membership

information to provide an opportunity to object or to obtain a protective order).
175. See cases cited supra note 174.
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discovery devices, it is clear that non-party privacy interests outweigh any
fairness issues to litigants. Strictly prohibiting such discovery would
substantially reduce the number of discovery disputes, it would save
valuable judicial time and resources, and it would lead to a more rapid
resolution of lawsuits.
In the lead paint cases, the defendants are merely going on fishing
expeditions hoping they can find some other hidden causes for the injuries.
This type of discovery practice does not even meet the direct relevance
threshold that is required before discovery of constitutionally protected
material can be allowed." 6 Allowing discovery in these cases only raises
more questions then it answers.' It has the potential to expand the litigation
beyond recognition and to confuse the issues.' Perhaps this is the outcome
that the defendant wants in order to force a settlement or drag the case out,
but it is not a legitimate compelling interest.
The defendants do have a legitimate interest in limiting their liability
only to injuries for which they are responsible. It is not unfair, however, to
deny them access to non-party medical records because the non-party's
health is not at issue, and because it is the plaintiff, not the defendant, who
has the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of causation. Additionally, the
intrusion into the non-party's medical records is especially unjustified in
lead paint cases because the claims of genetic causation are only speculative
at best.'79 Even in the future when genetic science becomes more conclusive
and presumptively the direct relevance threshold can be met, discovery of
non-party medical records should still be prohibited because the inherent
intrusiveness would be much greater than it is today. What could be more
intrusive than having someone gain access to your genetic blueprint?
In the injury at birth cases when a suit is brought on behalf of the
infant, the mother's prenatal medical records cannot be considered those of
a non-party. Although the mother is in fact a non-party, under the
"impossibility of severance" theory her prenatal medical records are
necessarily her child's earliest medical records. 8 ' Discovery should be
strictly limited to the period from conception to birth.'' The mother does
have legitimate privacy interests in these records but public policy demands
that she should not be allowed to frustrate her child's legitimate claims."
In medical malpractice cases where knowledge or notice is not an
essential element of the claim, non-party medical records are not directly
relevant and there is no legitimate need to seek their discovery. Any
176.
177.
1999).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See Tylo v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736 (1997).
See Andon v. 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 690 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (N.Y. App. Div.
See id.
See MonicaW. v. Milevoi, 685 N.Y.S.2d 231,234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
See cases cited supranote 78.
See Murphy v. LoPresti, 648 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
See Palay v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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discovery attempt would be an unnecessary and unwarranted intrusion on
the privacy rights of others.
As for the medical negligence cases where knowledge or notice must be
proven, non-party medical records could very well be relevant. Assuming
these records are directly relevant, the intrusion is still unwarranted in light
of the fact that there are alternative methods for acquiring such information.
Although a minority of courts allows the discovery of redacted medical
records, this is not a suitable alternative. Redacting the medical records is
not the solution for many reasons; time and money are wasted disputing
discovery and redacting records, the confidential nature of the medical
records is breached, and there is a distinct possibility that the non-party's
identity will be discovered.
Other alternative methods for attaining information necessary to supply
the knowledge or notice elements include using interrogatories and
depositions. The downside to these methods is that they require the party
seeking discovery to rely on the truthfulness of the opposing party. There
are some legitimate claims that will be unable to surmount the burden of
establishing notice or knowledge without access to non-party records, but
this is the price that must be paid in order to protect non-party privacy
interests. It may seem like a steep price to pay, but at least the litigants can
rest assured that their medical records will enjoy the same protection from
discovery by others.
Strictly prohibiting the use of non-party medical records has many
advantages. First, it is easy to enforce. Second, it is judicially economical.
The courts will not have to spend time hearing motions, issuing protective
orders, conducting in camera inspections, and handling appeals. Third, the
parties would be forced to get right to the relevant issues so they can quickly
and efficiently resolve their disputes instead of wasting time arguing about
the scope of discovery. Finally, it would protect the privacy rights of
everyone with medical records.
CONCLUSION

Privacy is a fundamental and inalienable right.' The right to privacy
attaches to the sensitive information that is found within our medical
records.' Besides enjoying a constitutional right to privacy, we each hold
Any
the physician-patient privilege as to our own medical records."
intrusion into this sensitive area is objectionable. When one brings a
lawsuit they waive their physician-patient privilege as to their own medical
records that are directly relevant to the claim; 86 however, they do not enjoy

183.
184.
185.
186.

See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.

See Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
See CAL. EviD. CODE § 993 (Deering, LEXIS through 1999 session).
See Davis v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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the freedom to waive the privilege for others. Although litigants often seek

the medical records of non-parties, the need for this information and the
right to the ascertainment of truth in legal proceedings are substantially

outweighed by the non-party's right to privacy.
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